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Abstract 
    This paper argues that there are two types of double object constructions (DOCs) in 
English: one is the DOC counterpart of the possessive have construction, and the other is the 
DOC counterpart of the existential have construction. Certain characteristics of the two have 
constructions are inherited to the two corresponding types of DOCs. By acknowledging the 
existence of the two distinct types of DOCs in English, we can finally account for not only some 
of the data of the DOC given in the literature but also the observations made by Oehrle (1976), 
which seem to have been somewhat overlooked. 
 
1.  Introduction 
    The double object construction (DOC), as exemplified in (1), has been examined by 
various researchers in several different theoretical frameworks (Green (1974), Oehrle (1976), 
Larson (1988, 1990), Pinker (1989), Jackendoff (1990), Goldberg (1992, 1995), Harley (2003), 
Beck and Johnson (2004), Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2008), to name a few). 
 
 (1)   Mike gave Mary a book. 
 
It has sometimes been argued that the relation between the indirect and direct objects of the 
DOC denotes a similar relation to that denoted by the relation between the subject and object of 
have sentences such as (2) (e.g. Green (1974), Ross (1976), Pinker (1989), Harley (2003), Beck 
and Johnson (2004)): 
 
 (2)   Mary has a book. 
 
Taking (1) for example, the giving event initiated by Mike resulted in Mary having a book. 
    However, as far as I know it has not been pointed out that, in accordance with there being 
言語と文明 第 15 巻 2017 年 3月 
－22－ 
two different have constructions in English, there are two different types of DOCs. Examples of 
the two different have constructions are given below: 
 
 (3) a.  She has a child. 
  b.  Hei has a hole in hisi shoe. 
 
Sentence (3a) is an instance of the possessive have construction, and sentence (3b) is an 
example of the existential have construction. The former denotes a situation where the subject 
referent has a child of her own, and the latter refers to a situation where there is a hole in a shoe 
that the subject referent wears. Examples of the two types of DOCs are given below:   
 
 (4) a.  Providence gave Mike a child. 
  b. % This gave Mikei several more people at hisi disposal. 
 
Sentence (4a) instantiates the possessive type of the DOC, and sentence (4b) instantiates the 
existential type.1 The former denotes a situation in which the person named Mike got a child of 
his own because of the protective care of God; the latter denotes a situation where the person 
named Mike came to be able to use several more people for certain purposes because of the 
entity or event denoted by the subject referent. Sentence (4a) is the DOC counterpart of the 
possessive have construction, and sentence (4b) is the DOC counterpart of the existential have 
construction. Certain characteristics of the two different have constructions to be clarified below 
are inherited to the corresponding types of DOCs. It is not until the distinction between the two 
different types of DOCs is made explicit that some of the data of the DOC presented in the 
literature can be properly understood. For example, the existential type of the DOC is actually 
instantiated by sentences like those in (5), which will be clear from the discussion in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
 (5) a.  I gave Ted my keys until tomorrow. (Ross (1976: 267)) 
  b.  I gave John my bicycle for the afternoon. (Oehrle (1976: 22)) 
 
    Furthermore, the assumption of the distinction enables us to account for the observations 
made by Oehrle (1976), which, despite the abundance of studies on the DOC, seem to have 
                                                  
1 Some English native speakers find acceptable examples of the existential type of the DOC 
like (4b), while others do not. The % in front of the sentence in (4b) reflects this variability in 
judgments. This marker is employed throughout this paper.   
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been somewhat overlooked. Oehrle (1976: 19) notes that the instance of the DOC in (6a) has 
two interpretations given in (6b):2 
 
 (6) a.  Nixon gave Mailer a book. (Oehrle (1976: 19)) 
  b.  On reading (i), [6a] asserts that the ownership of the book passed from Nixon 
to Mailer; on reading (ii), [6a] is compatible with a situation in which Nixon 
merely handed the book to Mailer, and questions of ownership are simply 
irrelevant. (Oehrle (1976: 19), with modifications, bold mine) 
 
In our framework, reading (i) of sentence (6a) is an instance of the possessive type of the DOC, 
and reading (ii) is an example of the existential type. It should be emphasized here that the 
existential type does not involve the relation of ownership between the indirect object and direct 
object arguments.  
    One possible implication of the discussion here will be that the distinction between the two 
types of DOCs must be taken into account, regardless of the difference in theoretical framework 
employed, in hypothesizing the representation(s) of the DOC.  
    This paper is organized as follows: section 2 overviews the possessive and existential have 
constructions in English. Section 3 points out the existence of the corresponding types of DOCs. 
Section 4 gives concluding remarks.   
 
2.  Possessive and existential have constructions 
    This section introduces the possessive and existential have constructions. Both 
constructions demonstrate the referential dependency of one argument upon the subject 
argument. The possessive have construction exhibits a referential dependency of the object 
argument on the subject argument (Takeuchi (2013)); on the other hand, the existential have 
construction demonstrates the same kind of dependency between the complement of the 
preposition and the subject argument (e.g. Nakau (1991), Harley (1998)).   
    The object argument of the possessive have construction is referentially dependent on the 
subject argument (Takeuchi (2013)). For example, the sentences in (7), with universal 
quantifiers in the subject positions, exhibit this dependency clearly. Consider (7):   
 (7) a.  Everyone has a house. 
                                                  
2 Oehrle (1976: 19) gives another interpretation of sentence (6a). He notes that “[6a] is 
compatible with a situation in which Mailer wrote a book which he wouldn’t have been able to 
write if it hadn’t been for Nixon.” This interpretation is not dealt with in this paper due to the 
limitation of space, although sentence (6a) on this reading can be considered to be an instance 
of the possessive type of the DOC (cf. Takeuchi (2015)). 
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  b.  Everyone has a wife. 
 
That is to say, each member of the set denoted by the quantifier has a house or wife different 
from any other member’s in the same set; the values of the direct objects covary with the values 
of the subjects.  
    Note that the referential dependency is not observed in sentences with verbs like know.  
Observe (8):  
 
 (8)   Everyone knows a {house / wife}. 
 
The sentence in (8) does not refer to situations where each member of the set denoted by the 
quantifier knows a house or wife of his or her own. In fact, English native speakers find it rather 
difficult to interpret sentence (8). The data in (7) and (8) indicate that the possessive have 
construction is associated with the referential dependency of one element on another. 
    By hypothesizing the referential dependency in the possessive have construction, we can 
account for the fact that the possessive have construction exhibits the definiteness restriction, a 
restriction against definite NPs in the object position of the construction (Costa (1974), Heine 
(1997), Tham (2006), among others). Observe (9):  
 
 (9) a.  Judy has {a / *the} car. (Heine (1997: 35), asterisk added by the author) 
  b.  John has {a / *the} wife. (cf. Tham (2006: 137)) 
 
The definite articles in the object NPs of the sentences in (9) hinder the references of the NPs 
from being fixed in terms of the references of the subjects, since the definite articles in this 
particular position cannot refer back to the subject referents (cf. Guéron (2003: 212-213)).3, 4 
    The complement of the preposition of the existential have construction is referentially 
dependent on the subject argument. This dependency is clearly observed in the sentences in (10), 
where there are universal quantifiers in the subject positions: 
 
 (10) a.  Everyonei has your name on hisi hat. 
  b.  Everyonei has Colin Powell at hisi disposal.   
                                                  
3  Harley (2004: 259) notes that Jacqueline Guéron (p.c.) also observes the definiteness 
restriction demonstrated by the possessive have construction. 
4 The definiteness restriction exhibited by the possessive have construction does not seem to be 
inherited to its counterpart of the DOC for reasons currently unknown.   
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Each member of the set denoted by the quantifier in (10a) has someone else’s name (written) on 
his hat; similarly, each member of the set denoted by the quantifier in (10b) can ask Colin 
Powell to do almost anything for them. For example, each member can have him go wherever 
they want him to go. Both these cases exhibit the covariation of the value of the complement of 
the preposition with the value of the subject.   
    The referential dependency in question is also illustrated by the following data:   
 
 (11)   She has a hole in {heri / *his} shirt. (cf. Nakau (1991: 341)) 
 
As is clear in (11), when the PP contains a pronoun, the pronoun must refer back to the subject. 
    The referential dependency is not observed between the complement of the preposition and 
the subject argument in sentences with verbs like put. Consider (12): 
 
 (12)   Shei put a magazine on {heri / his / their} sofa. 
 
What seems to be at issue here is the lexical meaning of the verb appearing in this sentence, 
namely put. The person who does the act of putting and the place where something is put do not 
need to be referentially dependent upon each other; in other words, the reference of a place 
where something is put does not need to be determined in relation to the reference of a person 
who puts it there. The facts illustrated in (11) and (12) indicate that the existential have 
construction is associated with the referential dependency of one element on another. 
    There is no relation of so-called ownership between the subject and (surface) object 
arguments of the existential have construction. For example, sentence (11) describes a situation 
where there is a hole in a shirt worn by the subject referent, not a situation where the subject 
referent owns a hole and it is in a shirt. This is illustrated by the diagnostics presented in 
Takeuchi (2010). Consider (13): 
 
 (13) a.  There is a hole in her shirt. 
  b. * Heri hole is in heri shirt. 
 
Sentence (11) can be paraphrased as sentence (13a), not as sentence (13b). The marker in front 
of sentence (13b) indicates that the sentence cannot function as a paraphrase of sentence (11). 
    The classification between possessive and existential constructions is supported by the 
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following data:5 
 
 (14) a. * He has a house for the day. 
  b. * He has a wife for the day. 
 (15) a.  Hei has a bag on hisi back for the day. 
  b.  The tablei has a lamp on iti for the day. 
 
As illustrated in (14) and (15), expressions such as for the day can co-occur only with the 
existential construction. The fact that expressions denoting limited duration cannot easily occur 
in the possessive construction indicates that the construction expresses a rather atemporal 
relation between the subject and object arguments. On the other hand, the data in (15) indicate 
that the existential construction expresses a spatio-temporally limited relation between the 
subject argument and the situation denoted by the elements following have. Sentence (15a) 
denotes a relation between the subject referent and there being a bag on his back, and sentence 
(15b) refers to a relation between the subject referent and there being a lamp on the top of it. 
These spatial relations can easily be bounded.  
    Last but not least, the PP of the existential construction of have can be omitted. As 
observed by Costa (1974), certain have sentences can instantiate the existential construction 
even though there is no PP appearing in surface structure. For example, Costa (1974) gives an 
example where the PP is omitted for contextual reasons. Consider (16):   
 
 (16) A:  Hey, something’s tickling my nose – do I have something up my nose? 
  B:  You have a fly, believe it or not. (Costa (1974: 17), bold mine) 
 (17)   You have a fly up your nose.   
 
The PP of the have sentence uttered by Speaker B in (16) is introduced in the previous sentence 
uttered by Speaker A and thus is omitted in sentence B. The have sentence in (16B) is actually 
the have sentence in (17). This fact will be of use in the following section.   
 
                                                  
5 Sentence (14a) is acceptable in a situation where the subject referent has rented a house for 
special purposes (e.g. for a special party) for a day or two. In this interpretation, no definiteness 
restriction can be observed, as illustrated in (i), indicating that a have sentence with this 
interpretation does not instantiate the possessive have construction.  
 
 (i)  Mike has {Mary’s / the} house for the upcoming party. 
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3.  Possessive and existential types of DOCs 
    This section points out the existence of two types of DOCs: the possessive and existential 
types. They correspond to the possessive and existential have constructions, respectively. The 
direct object argument of the possessive type of the DOC is referentially dependent on the 
indirect object argument; on the other hand, the complement of the preposition of the existential 
type of the DOC is referentially dependent on the indirect object argument. It is not until the 
distinction between the two types of DOCs is made explicit that one can provide a proper 
explanation for some of the data of the DOC given in the literature. 
    Instances of the possessive type of the DOC are given in (18): 
 
 (18) a.  Providence gave him a {house / wife}. 
  b.  Providence gave everyone a {house / wife}. 
 
The direct object argument in sentence (18a) is referentially dependent upon the indirect object 
argument; that is to say, after the giving event the indirect object referent got a house or wife of 
his own. This dependency is more clearly observed in sentence (18b), where there is a universal 
quantifier in the indirect object position. In this case, each member of the set denoted by the 
quantifier had or got a house or wife different from any other member’s in the same set; 
sentence (18b) exhibits the covariation of the value of the direct object with the value of the 
indirect object.  
    By assuming the referential dependency of the direct object argument upon the indirect 
object argument, we can provide an explanation for a brief observation made by Harley (2003). 
She observes that the DOC in (19) can express the idea that John impregnated Mary; that is, 
Mary got her own child:   
 
 (19)   John gave Mary a child. (Harley (2003: 42)) 
 
In the present framework, the DOC in (19) instantiates the possessive type; that is to say, the 
reference of the direct object argument is determined in relation to the reference of the indirect 
object argument. Therefore, the child in question is interpreted as Mary’s child; the referential 
dependency gives birth to the interpretation made by Harley. 
    Let us move on to the discussion on the existential type of the DOC. Instances of this type 
are given in (20):  
 
 (20) a. % This gave himi several more people at hisi disposal. 
  b. % Julia turned to Gracei and handed heri the small package in heri hand. 
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(The Courtship of the Vicar’s Daughter) 
  c. % They handed heri the paper in heri hand. Shei was so amazed.  
(Short Stories for the Young and Old at Heart) 
 
This type demonstrates the referential dependency of an element within the complement of the 
preposition upon the indirect object argument. Consider (21):   
 
 (21) a. * This gave him several more people at her disposal. 
  b. * Julia turned to Gracei and handed heri the small package in his hand. 
  c. * They handed her the paper in his hand. 
 
As illustrated in (20) and (21), the pronouns in the PPs must refer back to the referents of the 
indirect objects; in (20), the pronouns his and her in the PPs function as formal bound variables. 
    The referential dependency in the existential type of the DOC is more clearly observed in 
sentence (22), with a universal quantifier in the indirect object position:   
 
 (22)  % This gave everyonei Colin Powell at hisi disposal. 
 
In this case, the person named Colin Powell was available to each member of the set denoted by 
the quantifier. The value of the complement of the preposition covaries with the value of the 
indirect object; the pronoun his in the PP in (22) as well functions as a formal bound variable.  
    The possessive type of the DOC is the DOC counterpart of the possessive have 
construction; the existential type is the DOC counterpart of the existential have construction. 
This classification is supported by the following data:   
 
 (23) a. * Providence gave them a daughter for the day. 
  b. * Maryi’s long prayers gave heri a child for the weekend. 
 
As is the relation between the subject and object arguments of the possessive have construction, 
the relation between the indirect object and direct object arguments of the possessive type of the 
DOC is rather atemporal. This is illustrated by the sentences in (23), where expressions 
delimiting the relation such as for the day and for the weekend cannot occur.   
    As is the relation between the subject and the situation denoted by the elements following 
have in the existential have construction, the existential type of the DOC expresses a 
spatio-temporally limited relation between the indirect object and the situation denoted by the 
elements following it. This is confirmed by the fact that the relation can easily be bounded by 
expressions denoting limited duration. Consider (24): 
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 (24)  % This gave Mikei several more people at hisi disposal for the weekend. 
 
Expressions such as for the weekend can co-occur with this type of the DOC. Sentence (24) 
involves a situation where Mike came to be able to use a certain number of people for certain 
purposes because of the subject referent, and the situation is temporal and can thus easily be 
bounded. 
    The following kinds of data presented in the literature also instantiate the existential type:   
 
 (25) a.  I gave Ted my keys until tomorrow. (= (5a)) 
  b.  I gave John my bicycle for the afternoon. (= (5b)) 
  c.  Mary gave Bill the car until 3 o’clock (earlier this morning). 
(Harley (2011: 444)) 
   
The PPs of the sentences in (25) are not realized in surface structure. Sentence (25a) denotes a 
situation where the person named Ted came to be able to use keys belonging to the subject 
referent until the following day; sentence (25b) refers to a situation where the person named 
John came to be able to use speaker’s bike freely; sentence (25c) denotes a situation where the 
person named Bill came to be able to use the car in question until three o’clock because of the 
subject referent. The sentences in (25) all express situations that can be bounded, namely, the 
situations of an item or items belonging to the subject referent being available for another 
person to employ. 
    In cases like (25), it may be the case that the concept expressible by expressions like at 
one’s disposal does not appear for contextual reasons. The PP of the existential type of the DOC 
may not be realized in surface structure, as is the case with the existential have construction 
exemplified in (26): 
 
 (26) A:  Hey, something’s tickling my nose – do I have something up my nose? 
  B:  You have a fly, believe it or not. (= (16)) 
 
The PP of the have sentence uttered by Speaker B in (26) is introduced in the previous sentence 
uttered by Speaker A and thus is omitted in sentence B.6 
 
                                                  
6 I leave for future research the clarification of the exact nature of the non-realization of the PP of 
the existential type of the DOC.  
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    Now that we have argued for the existence of the two distinct types of DOCs, we can 
finally provide an explanation for the two interpretations of one instance of the DOC given by 
Oehrle (1976). Consider (6) again, repeated here as (27): 
 
 (27) a.  Nixon gave Mailer a book.  
  b.  On reading (i), [27a] asserts that the ownership of the book passed from 
Nixon to Mailer; on reading (ii), [27a] is compatible with a situation in 
which Nixon merely handed the book to Mailer, and questions of 
ownership are simply irrelevant.  
 
Reading (i) instantiates the possessive type of the DOC, while reading (ii) instantiates the 
existential type, whose PP is not realized. Sentence (27a) on reading (ii) describes a situation 
where Nixon having handed the book to Mailer resulted in the book being available to Mailer 
for a certain amount of time. The two types can be disambiguated by the appearance of 
expressions like until tomorrow. Observe (28): 
 
 (28)   Nixon gave Mailer a book until tomorrow. 
 
The sentence in (28) can only instantiate reading (ii), that is, the existential type. 
    Sentence (29) will be another example of the existential type of the DOC whose PP is not 
realized in surface structure: 
 
 (29)   Give me the salt, please. 
 
Sentence (29) is an imperative sentence and can be uttered in a situation where the speaker 
wants the hearer to hand her the salt that is situated near the hearer. Since it is contextually 
evident, it will not be necessary in this case for the PP to be explicitly uttered. In imperatives 
sentences like (29) can occur expressions denoting limited duration. Consider (30): 
 
 (30)   Give me the car for the weekend. 
 
The implication would be that the car in question will be given back to its owner after the 
weekend.   
 
4.  Conclusion 
    This paper has argued for the existence of the two distinct types of double object 
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constructions (DOCs): the possessive type and the existential type. The former corresponds to 
the possessive have construction, and the latter to the existential have construction. I have 
revealed that some examples of the DOC given in the literature in fact instantiate the existential 
type. This distinction must be taken into account regardless of the difference in theoretical 
framework in which the DOC is investigated.   
    Let me add, lastly, another possible example of the existential type of the DOC, which 
seems to be included in (31) (the bold part): 
 
 (31)   Although theoreticians at first felt rather uncomfortable with renormalization 
theory they began to accept it since it gave them a tool at hand by which 
they could make numerical predictions that were in astonishing agreement 
with experiment. (Quantum Field Theory: Competitive Models, bold mine) 
 
In this case, the PP is realized as the expression at hand.   
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